University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship

1988

Rule 11 Revisited
William W. Schwarzer
UC Hastings College of the Law, schwarzw@uchastings.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1013 (1988).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/714

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

Faculty Publications
UC Hastings College of the Law Library
Schwarzer

William

Author:

William W. Schwarzer

Source:

Harvard Law Review

Citation:

101 Harv. L. Rev. 1013 (1988).

Title:

Rule 11 Revisited

Originally published in HARVARD LAW REVIEW. This article is reprinted with permission from
HARVARD LAW REVIEW and Harvard Law School .

COMMENTARIES
RULE 11 REVISITED
William W Schwarzer*
The current version of rule i i of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect four and one-half years ago. In an article published
two years later, I argued:
When [the need for sanctions arises] courts must not hesitate to enforce
Rule ii with due regard for lawyers' obligations to their clients ....
[Iff judges turn from Rule ii and let it fall into disuse, the message
to those inclined to abuse or misuse the litigation process will be clear.
Misconduct, once tolerated, will breed more misconduct ....

1

Courts appear to have heeded this admonition. The number of reported decisions enforcing the rule is estimated now to exceed 600,2
and there are presumably many more unreported rulings granting or
denying sanctions under rule ii. A jurisprudence of considerable
dimension has developed, although it is not entirely clear and consistent, to say the least. Rule i i has become a significant factor in civil
litigation, with an impact that has likely exceeded its drafters' expectations.
Controversy over the impact of the rule is growing. Its- supporters
argue that it has curbed litigation abuse, that its benefits outweigh
whatever detriment it may cause, and that no alternative yet proposed
can do the job. Its critics argue that it breeds wasteful litigation and
chills vigorous, creative advocacy. The intensity of the ongoing debate
warrants an examination of what we know about the rule and its
effects, and consideration of how its enforcement can be channeled to
better serve its purposes.
This Commentary first addresses the two major problems with the
current operation of the rule: the lack of predictability of the standard
of compliance and the excessive amount of litigation the rule generates. It then suggests an approach to enforcement designed to accomplish the rule's purposes more effectively and at less cost.
* United States District Judge, Northern District of California. I am indebted to my law
clerk Leora Gershenzon for her assistance in preparing this Commentary. I am also grateful to
Professor Georgene M. Vairo and to Jerrold Solovy of the Chicago Bar, who read and commented
on the manuscript.
I Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule zi - a Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. ISI,
204-05 (1985).
2 As of July I, 1987, there had been 564 reported rule ii decisions in the district courts and
courts of appeals. See Vairo, Report to the Advisory Committee on Amended Rule ii of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure s (unpublished, Sept. 1987).
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I. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF RULE 11
There is little empirical evidence assessing the impact of rule i i.
The few studies that are available indicate that most lawyers and
judges favor rule 1i,3 although many attorneys are concerned about
its chilling effect on meritorious claims. 4 Anecdotal evidence suggests
that district judges, although they are not of one mind, predominantly
favor the rule and, in varying degrees, enforce it. District judges
tend to share the widespread concern over litigation abuse. 5 In addition, they have a somewhat different perspective from that of lawyers, formed by daily exposure to a constant flow of poorly prepared,
ill-considered, and often misleading, if not downright deceptive, papers filed by attorneys.
Many district judges feel, as I do - although I would not quantify
the number - that rule ii has raised the consciousness of lawyers to
the need for a careful prefiling investigation of the facts and inquiry
into the law. To a considerable extent, I believe, it has accomplished
its drafters' purpose of causing lawyers to "stop [and] think '6 before
filing. Of course, many lawyers who file papers in federal court are
out of the mainstream: lawyers who do not participate in continuing
legal education programs or who are in federal court so rarely that
they have not yet received the message. But my unscientific observations lead me to believe that the majority of the lawyers practicing
in federal courts must be aware by now of the requirements of rule
3 To say that most lawyers support the rule, however, is not to say that all sectors of the
profession support it to the same degree. In a recent comprehensive survey conducted by the
New York State Bar Association, 93% of the judicial officers and 77% of the lawyers who
responded agreed that sanctions were necessary to discourage attorneys from bringing frivolous
cases or making frivolous motions. But approximately 50% of the plaintiff's lawyers and solo
practitioners expressed the belief that the threat of sanctions discourages meritorious litigation.
See New York State Bar Association, Report of the Committee on Federal Courts: Sanctions
and Attorneys' Fees 3 (June 8, 1987). About 75% of the judicial officers, 66% of all attorneys
responding, and half of the plaintiffs' lawyers and solo practitioners did not believe that the
rule discouraged the assertion of meritorious claims. See id. Out of 8ooo persons surveyed,
2o% of the lawyers and 40% of thefederal judicial officers responded. See id. at 2. The
plaintiffs' bar's less enthusiastic support for rule ix may reflect the fact that the overwhelming
majority of motions for sanctions are made against plaintiffs' lawyers, and that such motions
are granted at a rate of approximately 6o%, whereas only 5o% of sanctions motions made
against defense counsel are granted. See Vairo, supra note 2, at 6-7.
4 The advisory committee note states that "[tihe rule is not intended to chill an attorney's
enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories." FED. R. CIv. P. xi advisory
committee note to 1983 amendments, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, xgg (1983) [hereinafter
"Advisory Notes"].
5 See, e.g., Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended FederalRule zz - Some "Chilling"Problems
in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1316-17 (1986)
(noting the frustration of one district judge).
6 Advisory Notes, supra note 4, at 192; see Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay Prompted
the New Rules of Civil Procedure, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24; Miller, The Adversary
System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. i, 19 (1984).
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ii. This awareness has certainly deterred some frivolous, wasteful,
or abusive litigation.
But at what cost? According to its critics, rule ii deters lawyers
from asserting marginal yet potentially meritorious claims or defenses.
In addition, they charge, motions for sanctions breed extensive satellite
litigation that adds to the waste and delay the rule was supposed to
eliminate.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH RULE 11
7
A. Unpredictability Under the Rule

In interpreting and applying rule ii, the courts have become a
veritable Tower of Babel. Courts have upheld sanctions:
(i) "[w]hen an attorney recklessly creates needless costs";8
(2) "[w]here .

.

. [the plaintiff's attorney] has made no inquiry or has

made an inquiry that has revealed no information supporting a
claim"; 9
(3) where the attorney insisted "on litigating a question in the face of
controlling precedent .

.

. and failure to discover such overwhelming

precedent suggests a lack of reasonable inquiry"; 10
(4) where a paper is "frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual
foundation";"
(5) "where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance
of success under the existing precedents, and where no reasonable
12
argument can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law";
(6) where there is "no support in any
possible theory of law or any
13
possible interpretation of the facts."
7 This Commentary is limited to the first prong of rule ii:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law ....
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed
it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction ....
This Commentary does not address the prohibition against papers filed for an improper purpose.
Few courts have imposed sanctions on this ground, and I am aware of no claim that to do so
would chill legitimate advocacy. The improper purpose inquiry turns on the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the finding, something with which the courts are well qualified to deal. See
Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standardsfor Rule zz Sanctions, ioo HARV. L. REv.
630, 643-44 (1987).
8 In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7 th Cir. 1985).
9 Foster v. Michelin Tire Corp., to8 F.R.D. 412, 415 (C.D. Ill. 1985).
10 Nixon v. Phillipoff, 6,5 F. Supp. 89o, 896 (N.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d 596 (7 th Cir.
x986).
11 Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
12Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. x985).
13Carr v. Times Picayune Publishing Corp., 61g F. Supp. 94, 98 (E.D. La. s985).
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Perhaps they are all saying the same thing in different words. In the
logic of the law, however, the use of different words at least raises an
inference that a different meaning is intended.
Even if all of the courts meant the same thing, they have not
applied the rule in the same way. Although the standard that governs
attorneys' conduct is objective reasonableness, what a judge will find
to be objectively unreasonable is very much a matter of that judge's
subjective determination. 14 Judges differ in what they expect of lawyers and in the way they accommodate the values in tension in the
adversary system: the duty owed to the client versus the obligation
owed to the court. A survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center,
in which some 3oo district judges participated, illustrates the disparate
responses of different judges to identical fact situations. 15
One of the principal sources of confusion is the emphasis on the
merits of claims and defenses that has become a dominant theme in
rule ii proceedings. This orientation has been reflected both in the
papers filed in motions for sanctions and in the decisions on these
motions. 16 The prevailing approach is illustrated by the Second Circuit's "absolutely no chance of success and no reasonable argument"
standard, listed above as item (5). Undoubtedly there are claims and
defenses on whose patent lack of merit lawyers and judges would
generally agree, but they are rare. It is difficult, however, to predict
with certainty whether a particular claim or defense will be held to
fall within that definition.
The circumstances of the cases also affect whether a court will
find a particular paper to violate rule ii. Although one of the major
elements of the 1983 revision of the rule was the deletion of all
reference to wilfulness, 17 judges will be influenced by whether they
perceive the action as reflecting deliberate decision or only inexperience or negligence.

14See, e.g., Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 83o; Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254; Golden Eagle Distrib.
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 8oi F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. x986).
Is See Kassin, An EmpiricalStudy of Rule ii Sanctions (Federal Judicial Center 1985). The
Center asked judges how they would rule on io fact situations arising under rule i i. Although
97% of the judges agreed that one of the problems involved a rule xi violation, and 85% said
they would impose sanctions, there was no such consensus on most of the other problems. See
id. at 17. The survey was conducted in 1984, when rule xx was new and the law under it only
beginning to develop. Its results are not necessarily representative of the current state of opinion.
16 See, e.g., Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 830-31; MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d
500, 503-05 (9th Cir. z986); Hasty v. Paccar, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1577, 1579-8o (E.D. Mo.
1984); Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. 154, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Lucha, Inc. v. Goeglein, 575
F. Supp. 785, 788 (E.D. Mo. 1983).

My criticism of merit-oriented rule ii jurisprudence does not imply that I think these
particular cases were wrongly decided. Moreover, the circumstances in which some rule ix
cases arise may make it unnecessary to address the prefiling investigation in the decision.
17 See Advisory Notes, supra note 4, at 197, 200.
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Unpredictability also stems from the volatile character of many
areas of the law.' 8 Consider, for example, the case of the apparently
intoxicated driver who recovered from a telephone booth manufacturer
for the injuries she sustained when her car veered off the road, jumped
a curb, crossed a sidewalk, entered a parking lot, and crashed into
the telephone booth. 19 As the Ninth Circuit recently said of the law
of wrongful discharge: "The rapid and recent evolution of the law in
this area highlights the precariousness of drawing a line between
20
plausible and sanctionable arguments."
Thus, there is good ground for arguing that the standard a court
will apply under rule i i is unpredictable. Whether this unpredictability has chilled advocacy, however, is less clear. Proof that conduct
has been deterred is elusive. The facts in the reported cases are
egregious. Whatever the vagueness of the standards the cases articulate, lawyers should have little to fear in light of the type of conduct
that courts have punished. My own experience has disclosed no anecdotal evidence of chilling. 2 ' The question probably can never be
resolved other than on an intuitive level.
Regardless of how one resolves the debate over the existence of
chilling effects, however, there is a problem of fairness. Sanctions
may have penal consequences, including injury to a lawyer's reputation, investigation by state bar associations, and adverse effects on
malpractice insurance coverage. Such consequences may well be appropriate in particular cases, but fairness requires that those cases be
22
defined with reasonable certainty and predictability.

B. Excessive Litigation Under the Rule
The second problem is the excessive amount of litigation activity
rule ii has spawned. The drafters explicitly warned against allowing
18 See, e.g., Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., No. 87-5248, slip op. at 6-8 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 1987)
(denying motion for sanctions under Rule ii for filing of wrongful discharge action).
19See Bigbee v. Pacific Tel., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 665 P.2d 947, rg8 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1983).
20 Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 827 F.2d 450, 454 (9 th Cir. 1987).
21 Critics of the rule have argued that it is antithetical to the liberal notice pleading regime
created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when they were adopted in 1937. See Note,
supra note 7, at 63o. The argument ignores subsequent history characterized by widespread
litigation abuse and misuse within the framework established by the rules. It was the reaction
to this development that fueled the 1983 amendments, which represent a substantial change
from the conception in 1937. See Nelken, supra note 5, at 1313.
22 Of course, discretion - and the possibility of substantially different outcomes before
different judges - is an integral element of the litigation process: discretion is exercised, often
on the basis of only a fragmentary record, in the granting and denying of injunctive relief and
other substantive motions and in many kinds of evidentiary rulings. Such discretion is necessary
if trial judges are to manage the litigation before them effectively. But that is a different matter
from giving lawyers fair notice of what is required of them to avoid sanctions.
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the cost of "satellite litigation" to offset the rule's benefits. 23 The
avalanche of rule ii cases suggests that the warning is being ignored.
This situation results from the rule's inherent unpredictability and the
readiness of lawyers to resort to any device available to exert pressure
on their opponents. Despite its salutary effects, Rule i i has added
substantially to the volume of motions in the district courts and appeals in the circuit courts.
This activity leads to waste and delay. It also carries with it the
potential for increased tension among the parties and with the court.
Sanction proceedings can affect personal relations, making it more
difficult to conduct the litigation in a rational manner and reach
accommodation. This is not invariably true because there are some
whose behavior improves only under the threat of sanctions; moreover,
sanction-prone lawyers are not likely to litigate on a platonic level in
any event. Nevertheless, when lawyers go to war under rule i i,
litigation tends to become less manageable.

ImI.

THE REMEDY

Rule ii should not be repealed. The litigation abuse which necessitated the rule remains with us and requires ongoing remedial
measures. Eliminating the rule would send the wrong message to
lawyers.
Nor would semantic surgery overcome the rule's present problems.
No one as yet has come up with a definition of frivolousness that
would allow one to predict with some certainty whether a claim is so
far beyond the pale that no judge would listen to it sympathetically;
an attempt to do so would be disingenuous. One is reminded of the
observation of the great physicist Niels Bohr: "I try not to speak more
24
clearly than I think."
Instead, we must rethink the way in which we enforce rule ii.
The purpose of the rule, as stated by the Advisory Committee, is
twofold: "[to] discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to stream'25
line the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses.
Without explicitly articulating an interpretative rationale, courts often
tend to emphasize the second purpose, focusing on the merit - or
lack of merit - of claims and defenses. This has made rule ii
analogous to an enhancement statute under which a penalty is added
when a dismissal is sufficiently emphatic; courts distinguish between
23 Advisory Notes, supra note 4, at 201.
24 R. RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 77 (1986). See, e.g., Note, supra note

7, at 638, 650, 652 (urging a "general theory for evaluating the plausibility of legal arguments"
but finally arriving at a standard based on whether the claim is "unthinkable").
2s Advisory Notes, supra note 4, at 198.
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claims and defenses that are meritless and those that are so meritless
as to warrant sanctions.
Some courts, moreover, have tended to see rule ii as an adjunct
to case management. This approach finds implicit support in the
Advisory Committee's unfortunate reference to "streamlin[ing] the litigation." 26 But as the distinction between dealing with the merits of
litigation and dealing with lawyer misconduct is obscured, a risk arises
that courts will do neither effectively. An illustration of this is presented when a court denies a motion for summary judgment but
27
sanctions the lawyer after trial for having brought a frivolous action.
One might well wonder how a case could be so frivolous as to warrant
sanctions if it has sufficient merit to get to trial.
One must keep in mind that the 1983 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which included an overhaul of rule ii, also
substantially revised rule 16, spelling out the extensive powers of the
trial judge to conduct meaningful pretrial procedures to narrow issues
and streamline the litigation so as to further the goals of economy and
expedition. When applied in conjunction with rule 16, rule 12 (governing dismissal of claims) and rule 56 (summary judgment) provide
an adequate set of tools for the early disposition of frivolous claims
and defenses.
It may be argued that the deterrent effect of rule ii sanctions is
nevertheless needed to minimize the costs that frivolous claims or
defenses impose on the opposing party. The force of that argument
is diluted by the additional costs imposed by the rule ii litigation
itself. In any event, the minimization of the cost of frivolous claims
and defenses is properly an objective of case management. The early
elimination of such claims or defenses is one of the purposes of the
scheduling conference, which is to be held within 12o days after an
action is filed. 28 If a claim or defense is indeed frivolous, that fact
should be sufficiently apparent, early in the litigation process, for the
judge or opposing counsel to address it and, by motion or other
appropriate measures, eliminate it with minimum expense. When this
has not occurred, judicial indifference or the lawyers' preoccupation
with collecting fees has probably been to blame. Resort to rule ii,
however, is not a good way of curing deficiencies in case management.
When case management functions as intended under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, it serves the purpose of avoiding unnecessary
26 See cases cited supra note 15.
27 See, e.g., Steinberg v. St. Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
see also Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1373
(1987). The court of appeals in Oliveri, in reversing the sanctions imposed below, noted that
"it would be inequitable to permit a defendant to increase the amount of attorneys' fees recoverable as a sanction by unnecessarily defending against frivolous claims .... ." Id. at 128o.
28 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
HeinOnline -- 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1019 1987-1988
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costs. The proper role of rule ii, however, is not to compensate
parties for such costs; it is to deter litigation abuse. 29 Although courts
may do so by awards of fees and expenses in appropriate cases, the
rule does not compensate parties for the costs of unmeritorious claims
or defenses. Some courts have read the latter objective - straightforward fee-shifting - into the rule. 30 There is little evidence to
support their view, however, and the vast majority of courts agree
that the rule's purpose is to deter abuse, with fee-shifting simply one
of several methods of achieving deterrence. 3 1 The advisory committee
note, although not entirely clear, speaks in terms of deterrence and
does not specifically refer to fee-shifting. 32 Rule 37 shows that when
the drafters of the rules meant to provide for fee shifting, they knew
33
how to do it.
Moreover, to attribute a broad fee-shifting rationale
to rule ii is contrary to the American Rule; fee shifting ought not to
34
be undertaken without clear authority.
Courts therefore should focus on rule ii as a vehicle to "discourage
dilatory and abusive tactics. '3 5 Apart from targeting conduct deliberately undertaken for an improper purpose, the rule is well designed
to address the filing of papers found to be dilatory and abusive under
an objective standard. It does so by requiring lawyers to certify that
they have made a reasonable inquiry prior to filing the paper to satisfy
36
themselves that it is supported by fact and law.

29 See Anschutz Petroleum Marketing v. E.W. Saybolt Co., 112 F.R.D. 355, 357 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); see also Nelken, supra note 5, at 1323-25.
30 See, e.g., In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446-47 (7th Cir. 1985).
31See, e.g., Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., No. 87-5248, slip op. at 6 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 1987);
Donaldson v. Clark, 81g F.2d 1551, 1557 (ilth Cir. 1987); In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183
(9th Cir. 1986). There is some debate among commentators over whether the deterrence objective was to be accomplished by penal sanctions or by fee-shifting, but they seem to agree that
deterrence of abuse is the overriding purpose. See, e.g., Levin & Sobel, Achieving Balance in
the Developing Law of Sanctions, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 587, 593 (1987); Nelken, supra note 5,
at 1323-25. Although Professor Nelken criticizes what she perceives as a penal approach to
sanctions, see id. at 1353, the more sparing use of sanctions under a penal rationale would
mitigate whatever chilling effects the rule may have.
32 See Advisory Notes, supra note 4, at 198.
33See FED. R. CIV. P. 3 7 (b)(2)(E), (c), (d), (g) (providing that on motions for discovery
orders, the judge shall award fees and expenses to the prevailing party unless justice otherwise
requires).
34 See Roadway Express Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759-61 (198o); Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York,
762 F.2d 243, 252 (2d Cir. x985).
35Advisory Notes, supra note 4, at 198.
36 Some commentators have argued that prefiling inquiry increases costs unnecessarily by
requiring the signing lawyer to duplicate investigations previously conducted by others. But
that is not the case. The requirement is satisfied so long as someone has performed an investigation and the certifying lawyer has in hand not simply an assurance, but some product of
that investigation. See Kendrick v. Zanides, 6o9 F. Supp. x162, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (Schwarzer, J.); Schwarzer, supra note i, at 187-88.
HeinOnline -- 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1020 1987-1988
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What is the importance of requiring a prefiling investigation? Primarily, it makes lawyers "stop and think"3 7 before they file papers.
It forces them to consider whether the facts found and the law developed justify the risks and costs that will follow from filing a paper.
An adequate investigation would disclose such crucial facts as whether
an action is time-barred, whether relevant sales occurred, whether
jurisdiction exists, or whether a boilerplate defense is baseless. The
premise is that the conscientious lawyer will be deterred from filing a
frivolous claim or defense, not so much by the fear of sanctions as by
inquiry.
the negative results of the prefiling
Courts are beginning to shift their focus from assessing the merits
to assessing the adequacy of the prefiling inquiry. For example, in
Kamen v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,38 an appeal from
sanctions imposed by the trial court after it dismissed the action, the
issue was whether the plaintiff's lawyer had conducted an adequate
prefiling inquiry into the factual basis of the action. The plaintiff's
claim of handicap discrimination depended on proof that the defendant had received federal financial assistance. In considering whether
sanctions were proper, the court did not ask whether the claim had a
plausible basis, but whether the plaintiff's attorney had conducted a
reasonable prefiling inquiry. In the absence of a specific finding by
the trial judge that there was inadequate prefiling inquiry, the Second
Circuit reversed the sanctions. 39 Judge Kearse, dissenting, read the
trial court's order below as implying such a finding, because the
attorney was seeking the needed information by discovery and nowhere asserted what, if any, information he had obtained prior to
40
filing.
In Albright v. Upjohn Co.,41 the plaintiff had sued several manufacturers of tetracycline-based drugs, alleging that the drugs had
stained her teeth permanently. The defendant Upjohn moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's interrogatory
answers and her doctor's records showed that none of the drugs
prescribed for the plaintiff -were manufactured by Upjohn. The trial
court granted the motion but denied sanctions. On defendant's appeal, a majority of the court held that the denial of sanctions was an
abuse of discretion. The court found the plaintiff's attorney's prefiling
investigation to be inadequate on the ground that such an investigation
should have disclosed the absence of any facts or other records upon
42
which to ground Upjohn's liability.

37 See Miller & Culp, supra note 6, at 34, col. I.
38 791 F.2d Ioo6 (2d Cir. I986).
39See id. at 1014.

40 See id. at IOI4-I6 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
41 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1986).
42 See id. at 1221; see also McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 8I

F.2d 1336, 1340-41 (9th
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Reliance on one's client as a source of facts will not necessarily
constitute a "reasonable inquiry." As the Fifth Circuit has stated:
"Blind reliance on the client is seldom a sufficient inquiry and certainly
not when the prior history of a case at the courthouse may well be
dispositive .

. .

. The rule's requirement of inquiry is a considered

response to a perceived problem of baseless claims. "43 The advisory
committee note explains that
what constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as
how much time for investigation was available to the signer; whether
he had to rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying
the pleading ... ;whether the pleading ... was based on a plausible

view of the law; or whether44 he depended on forwarding counsel or
another member of the bar.

It has been suggested that this statement indicates that the purpose
of the "reasonable inquiry" language was only to introduce flexibility
into rule ii, not to create an independent duty. 45 That view, however,
ignores the fact that the addition of the prefiling investigation requirement was a major purpose of the 1983 amendment. Adopting that
view would gut rule ii of what promises to be its most effective and
meaningful provision.
The rule does not limit the "reasonable" prefiling inquiry require46
ment to facts; a lawyer must investigate the applicable law as well.
It may be true, as the Ninth Circuit has said, that "[e]xtended research
alone will not save a claim that is without legal or factual merit from
the penalty of sanctions, '4 7 but prefiling research substantially inCir. 1987); Unioil Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 556-59 (9th Cir. 1986) O'Rourke
v. City of Norman, 640 F. Supp. 1451, 1470 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
43Southern Leasing Partners Ltd. v. McMullan, 8ox F.2d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 1986); see also
Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. xx62, 1172 (N.D. Cal. x985).
44 Advisory Notes, supra note 4, at 199.
45See Note, supra note 7, at 642.
46 See Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. xx
(1986); Saturn Systems, Inc. v. Saturn Corp., 659 F. Supp. 868, 871 (D. Minn. 1987).
Focusing on prefiling inquiry in enforcing rule ii applies to motions as well as to claims
and defenses in the pleadings. Because a properly presented motion draws its legal and factual
support from the underlying pleadings, the papers presenting a motion should attest to evidence
of the prefiling inquiry. If a motion as presented seems bereft of merit, a duty to mitigate is
imposed on the opposing party. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local No. xiS
v. Armour & Co. io6 F.R.D. 345 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Nelken, supra note 5, at 1334-35. A
motion so patently baseless as to violate rule ii should require little if any response. The judge
by timely intervention will often be able to determine whether any response is necessary. See
supra text accompanying note 28. Opposing counsel, in an effort to mitigate, may themselves
suggest to the court that no opposition be filed. If the court so directs, and the motion is denied
out-of-hand, there is little to warrant sanctions unless the court considers counsel's conduct to
be genuinely abusive.
47Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
HeinOnline -- 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1022 1987-1988

1988]

RULE ii REVISITED

102 3

creases the likelihood that counsel will not file such a claim without
developing a plausible argument.
The duty to make reasonable factual and legal inquiry only makes
sense, however, if the courts adhere strictly to the prefiling requirement. The rule is explicit on that point: to permit challenged pleadings to be justified by what Judge Milton Shadur has described as
"post-hoc sleight of hand" makes a travesty of the rule. 48 Yet that is
what generally occurs in practice. For rule ii to serve its purpose,
lawyers must be prepared to show that they performed a reasonable
prefiling investigation. To do so should add no new burdens: marshalling the available evidence to support the elements of one's claims
or defenses and summarizing the controlling authorities before filing
is no more than any responsible lawyer is expected to do. Far from
adding costs, the prefiling inquiry reduces them by deterring frivolous
claims and defenses.
A duty of reasonable prefiling inquiry assumes that attorneys will
act in conformity with what the inquiry discloses. That will not
invariably be true, however. Experience shows that at times lawyers
will proceed in the teeth of facts and law that make their position
wholly unmeritorious. It would therefore defeat the purpose of the
prefiling investigation requirement if attorneys were left free to conceal
or misrepresent critical adverse information. The Ninth Circuit recently acknowledged this principle in Pipe Trades Council v. Underground ContractorsAssociation,49 when it affirmed the imposition of
sanctions on two grounds. It first held the union's motion to compel
arbitration to be frivolous. It went on to hold, however, that the
union's failure to disclose to the court that its prior motion on the
same ground had been denied and was on appeal and that a determinative arbitration was then pending "constituted a breach of [the
movant's] duty of candor to disclose critical facts." 50° Similarly, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld sanctions against an attorney seeking an
to disclose his prior execution of a release of
award of fees for failing
5
his claim for fees. '
The scope of the duty of disclosure under rule ii is a matter of
controversy. Thus, when sitting as trial judge in Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,52 I sanctioned an attorney for

1985), appeal dismissed, 793 F.2d 295 (7th
48 In re Ronco, 105 F.R.D. 493, 498 (N.D. Ill.
Cir. 1986); see also Whittington v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 206 (E.D. Ky. 1987);
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Illinois Corp. ii6 F.R.D. 252, 254-55 (N.D. Ill.
1987).

49 828 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1987).
50 Id. at 615.
51 See Blackwell v. Department of Offender Rehabilitation, 807 F.2d 914, 9x5 (isth Cir.

1987).
S2 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. x984), rev'd, 80, F.2d 153I (9th Cir. 1986).
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contending that existing law supported the motion when, in fact, only
an argument to modify or extend existing law would support it. A
panel of the court of appeals reversed, holding that rule ii imposed
no duty to disclose to the court that the argument being made was
53
based not on existing law but on its modification or extension.
In enforcing the duty to make a reasonable prefiling investigation,
courts will need to consider carefully the extent of the attorney's duty
of candor to the court. Clearly an attorney is not obligated to make
the opponent's case, to disclose client confidences, or to substitute for
a judge in prescreening the client's claims.5 4 It is equally clear, even
under the pre-1983 rule ii, that deliberate deception of the court and
opposing counsel about critical facts, such as a party's citizenship, the
date of the accident, the absence of evidence to connect the defendant
to the claim, or the existence of a controlling decision would be "totally
"s
inconsistent with the letter and the spirit of Fed. R. Civ. P. II.5
The question is where to draw the line between inadequate lawyering and litigation abuse. Rule ii is not an all-purpose weapon to
enforce lawyers' ethics. But it is aimed at abusive conduct. Its purpose is implemented by requiring the filing lawyer to certify that a
prefiling investigation indicates that the paper is warranted by the
facts and a good faith legal argument. If the failure to make such an
investigation is abusive, then the failure to disclose that the results of
the investigation refute the lawyer's certificate must be considered
56
equally abusive.

IV. CONCLUSION
Shifting the focus of rule ii enforcement from merits to process
will not solve all problems. Redirecting it, however, from predicting
what some future court might say about a claim or defense to scrutinizing what a lawyer actually did, should materially reduce subjecs3 Five judges of the court joined in a lengthy and detailed dissent from a denial of an en
banc hearing. See 8og F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987).
54 See Golden Eagle, 8oi F.2d at 1542; Note, supra note 7, at 650.
55 Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., io8 F.R.D. 96, 102
(D.N.J. 1985); see also Perkinson v. Gilbert/Robinson, Inc., 821 F.2d 686, 69o-9i (D.C. Cir.
1987); All Hawaii Tours, Corp. v. Polynesian Cultural Center, x16 F.R.D. 645, 651-52 (D.
Haw. 1987).
56 See O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 640 F. Supp. 1457, 1469 (W.D. Okla. 1986); Thornton
v. Wahl, 787 F.2d I15i, 1154 ( 7th Cir. 1986); Blackwell v. Department of Offender Rehabilitation, 897 F.2d 914, 95I (iith Cir. 1987). One court has said that "Rule ix requires 'causation,'
i.e., that the failure to make reasonable inquiry result in the filing of a frivolous motion."
Continental Air Lines v. Group Sys. Int'l, iog F.R.D. 594, 597 (C.D. Cal. 1986). Rule xi, by
its terms, contains no such requirement and should not be read so narrowly. Presumably, a
court will not concern itself with the adequacy of a lawyer's prefiling inquiry unless it is material.
A material violation of rule ii is a sufficient predicate for sanctions.
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tivity and inconsistency. Lawyers and judges may not invariably
agree on what constitutes a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances, but it is reasonable to expect a greater consensus on that
question than on whether a claim or defense is frivolous. The former
involves an assessment of prevailing professional practice; the latter a
prognostication of how courts might in the future evaluate a claim or
defense.
This shift in focus will not necessarily make a difference in every
case, nor will it solve every problem. It probably will result in less
frequent imposition of sanctions. There may be cases in which implausible claims are asserted but the lawyer's prefiling inquiry could
not be faulted. Those cases are better relegated to case management
remedies.
The suggested approach should better serve the rule's deterrent
purpose, however. Being prepared to explain his or her actions will
help to concentrate an attorney's thinking, yet not chill "enthusiasm
57
or creativity.
At the same time, the approach should reduce the volume of rule
ii litigation. Much of the pressure behind that litigation has undoubtedly come from clients seeing a way to recoup some of their
legal expense incurred as a result of what they considered a frivolous
claim or defense. Once it becomes clear that an award of sanctions
will turn on proof of the absence of a reasonable prefiling investigation, the added burden on the moving party will make sanctions
motions less attractive. With private incentive to seek sanctions less58
ened, courts will use them "for the protection of the judicial process,"
leaving it to case management "to relieve the financial burden that
baseless litigation imposes." 59 With the focus not on what the parties
are doing to each other but on whether the lawyers are abusing the
litigation process, rule ii enforcement will move from private compensation to serving the larger interest of the judicial process.
S7 See supra note 4.
58

Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, io82 (7th Cir. 1987).

59

Id.
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